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Abstract
There is a paucity of evidence on the heterogeneous impacts of financial incentives on weight loss. Between
March 2010 and January 2012, in a randomized controlled trial, we assigned 700 obese persons to three
experimental arms. We test whether particular subgroups react differently to financial incentives for weight
loss. Two treatment groups obtained a cash reward (€150 and €300 with 237 and 229 participants,
respectively) for achieving an individually-assigned target weight within four months; the control group (234
participants) was not incentivized. Participants and administrators were not blinded to the intervention. We
find that monetary rewards effectively induced obese individuals to reduce weight across all subgroups.
However, there is no evidence for treatment-effect heterogeneity for those groups that were incentivized.
Among those who were in the €300 group, statistically significant and large weight losses were observed for
women, singles, and those who are not working (all above 4 kg in four months). In addition, the magnitude of
the reward matters only for women and migrants. The effectiveness of financial incentives to reduce weight
nevertheless raises sensitive ethical issues that should be taken into consideration by policymakers.
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 In a randomized controlled trial involving 700 obese persons as-
signed to three experimental arms, we test whether financial in-
centives have heterogeneous effects over subgroups on weight 
reduction. Two treatment groups obtained a cash reward (€150 
and €300 with 237 and 229 participants, respectively) for achiev-
ing an individually-assigned target weight within four months; the 
control group (234 participants) was not incentivized. Partici-
pants and administrators were not blinded to the intervention. 
We find that monetary rewards effectively induced obese individ-
uals to reduce weight across all subgroups. However, there is no 
evidence for treatment-effect heterogeneity for those groups that 
were incentivized. Among those who were in the €300 group, sta-
tistically significant and large weight losses were observed for 
women, singles, and those who are not working (all above 4 kg in 
four months). In addition, the magnitude of the reward matters 
only for women and migrants. 
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There is increasing interest on the part of policymakers, health professionals, and social scien-
tists to evaluate the impact of potential modifiers of behavior such as financial incentives. This 
kind of incentive is commonly used. For example, negative financial incentives are widely ap-
plied in the form of taxes on products such as alcohol or tobacco [Grossman et al. 1993]. Incen-
tive programs are not unusual for health insurers, who would like their customers to engage in 
healthy behavior [Stock et al. 2010]. However, the use of financial incentives in the treatment of 
obesity and overweight still raises ethical concerns [Halpern, Madison, and Volpp 2009], and its 
effectiveness is not well-established with respect to the issue of weight maintenance [Jeffery 
2012; John et al. 2011; Augurzky et al. 2015]. 
 A number of previous studies have issues with respect to sample size and methodology 
(see Paloyo et al. [2014] for an evidence-based survey of the literature), consequently making a 
causal interpretation of previous results unwarranted. Endogeneity and selection issues have 
not always been addressed adequately in the earlier literature. More recent evidence, however, 
shows that financial incentives can induce weight loss, at least in the short term [Augurzky et al. 
2012; Finkelstein et al. 2007; Volpp et al. 2008]. 
 However, it remains unknown whether subgroups of patients respond more than others 
to financial incentives [John, Loewenstein, and Volpp 2012]. It may turn out that money or the 
prospect thereof “nudges” only people with existing financial problems or special social or cul-
tural backgrounds toward a healthier lifestyle. If this is the case, financial incentives could be 
allocated more appropriately to probable responders to make disbursement more cost-effective. 
For subgroups where financial incentives do not matter, an alternative approach or combination 
of approaches may be necessary to induce positive behavioral changes that would lead to weight 
loss and weight maintenance in the long run. 
 Ethical issues pervade the use of financial incentives to change behavior. For instance, 
incentives could increase socioeconomic and health inequities, undermine the doctor–patient 
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therapeutic relationship, usurp personal autonomy, and—at least for those who are economical-
ly disadvantaged—be construed as coercive [Lunze and Paasche-Orlow 2013]. Issues of promot-
ing “mercenary” behavior (incentivizing behavior that ought to be done anyway), privacy con-
cerns (tracking sensitive medical information to evaluate compliance), and fairness (paying Pe-
ter for what Paul does for free) have also been raised [Halpern, Madison, and Volpp 2009]. Shaw 
[2007] flatly argues that it is not acceptable to pay for people to ensure compliance. More gener-
ally, ethical issues arise out of using nudges in modifying behavior, especially when designed to 
improve health [Blumenthal-Barby and Burroughs 2012]. 
 An ethical issue that is especially relevant for this paper is that which relates to hetero-
geneous effects. If a particular segment of the population responds to a financial incentive—say, 
those who are genetically predisposed to more easily achieve target weights and those who are 
located in an environment which allows for healthier food choices—then an incentive program 
may reward members of society who need less institutional help as opposed to providing sup-
port to those who need it most [Halpern, Madison, and Volpp 2009]. Policymakers may, howev-
er, recognize an ethical obligation to allocate scarce resources such that medical benefits are 
maximized, even if this results in differential treatment of individuals who differ with respect to 
their responsiveness to financial incentives. We discuss these ethical concerns later when we 
conclude. 
 A remaining institutional issue is the extent to and ease with which policies may be tar-
geted to responding subgroups. It may be the case that certain clinical measures (such as fasting 
blood sugar or low- or high-density lipoproteins) or psychological measures (such as the locus 
of control or the “Big Five” personality traits [Cobb-Clark and Schurer 2011; Cobb-Clark et al. 
2014]) are highly correlated with the success of financial incentives at inducing weight loss. 
However, administrative data are typically based on broad socioeconomic indicators, such as 
sex, employment status, educational attainment, citizenship, and place of residence. Collecting 
more detailed clinical and psychological indicators is a costly undertaking (and is rife with 
thorny privacy issues). From a policy perspective, therefore, it is administratively simpler to 
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deploy a broad-based financial-incentives program—one that is based on observable and easily 
verifiable socioeconomic characteristics, if we are to engage in any policy targeting at all. 
 We contribute to the literature by estimating the impact of financial incentives across a 
number of relevant subgroups. The estimated impacts can guide policymakers and health pro-
fessionals in choosing the most appropriate policy instrument for a particular group of people. 
Although there are a number of papers that estimate the impact of cash or near-cash incentives 
on weight loss, there has been no attempt thus far to examine seriously the potential for treat-
ment-effect heterogeneity across a number of baseline characteristics (John, Loewenstein, and 
Volpp [2012] provide some exploratory evidence). Even in the absence of treatment-effect het-
erogeneity, such a result would nevertheless provide policymakers and health professionals the 
license to apply an incentive system over a broad base, making its disbursement administrative-
ly simpler. This can contribute to its success in settings where the institutional mechanisms, 
including the number of qualified program administrators, are deficient. 
 This paper seeks to address this gap in the literature by analyzing a large-scale, prospec-
tive, randomized, controlled field experiment. Based on experimental data of 700 obese medical 
rehabilitation patients, the present analysis was conducted to test the primary hypothesis that 
randomly assigned positive, output-oriented financial incentives exhibit a heterogeneous treat-
ment effect on weight—measured in kilograms lost—as a function of baseline characteristics. 
Participants were assigned an individualized weight-loss target, and a financial reward was giv-
en to those who were able to achieve it or partially achieve it within four months. 
 In addition, we also contribute to the discussion on the ethical dimension of offering fi-
nancial incentives for health-related behavior and outcomes, as well as to the use of nudges in 
general to modify behavior. A number of ethical issues are immediately raised if people with 
certain characteristics respond to nudges more than others. These ethical issues typically have a 
direct link to anti-discriminatory legislation that aims to prevent groups of people being unduly 
prejudiced by an incentive scheme that does not take into account differing abilities. 
5 
 
 Our objective is to examine whether monetary rewards for weight loss are more influen-
tial on patients with certain baseline characteristics that are unaffected by the intervention. We 
are then able to identify responders and non-responders. In determining which characteristics 
are relevant for our analysis, we take the point of view of public administrators (e.g., social 
health insurers) who have data that are often limited to basic socioeconomic variables such as 
gender and employment status, and without direct information on income, wealth, or clinical 
indicators. 
 The global increase of obesity and its comorbidities is considered to be one of the tough-
est challenges confronting health-care systems worldwide. Between 1980 and 2008, the world-
wide prevalence of obesity more than doubled [Finucane et al. 2001]. By 2015, it is predicted 
that 2.3 billion adults will be overweight, with more than 700 million of them obese. In Germany 
in particular—the site of the experiment discussed in this paper—66 percent of the male and 
about 50 percent of the female adult population are overweight according to a large epidemio-
logical study with almost 20,000 participants aged between 14 and 80 years. The percentage of 
German adults being obese amounts to more than 20 percent [Max-Rubner Institut 2008]. 
 The associated economic burden of obesity is tremendous [Bhattacharya and Sood 
2011]. Incremental medical expenditures and the value of lost productivity, including absentee-
ism and presenteeism (health-related limitations at work), as a result of overweight and obesity 
are estimated by Finkelstein et al. [2010] to range from $322 for overweight to $6,087 for grade 
III obese men (morbidly obese or having a body-mass index (BMI) ≥ 40 kg/m2). For women, 
estimates range from $797 for overweight to $6,694 for grade III. In the US, it has been estimat-
ed that the total annual cost attributable to obesity among full-time employees is $73.1 billion. 
Individuals with a BMI above 35 kg/m2 represent 37 percent of the obese population, but are 
responsible for 62 percent of excess costs. Gates et al. [2008] report that workers with a BMI 
equal or above 35 kg/m2 experience the greatest health-related work limitations, being signifi-
cantly less productive than mildly obese workers. 
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 From an ethical perspective, the economic burden of obesity is a nontrivial matter. With-
in the context of a national or public health insurance system or where an employer-based 
scheme is in place (generally, where risk pooling exists), the costs associated with unhealthy 
individuals are already partially borne by those who are healthy or those who engage in healthi-
er activities. Cognizant of this, Halpern, Madison, and Volpp [2009] argue that it makes sense for 
a financial incentive scheme to be broadly implemented if it is cost-effective since it reduces the 
burden borne by those who are otherwise healthy. 
 The causes for the upsurge of obesity are well-known [Rosin 2008]. The increase of en-
ergy-dense convenience or fast foods, the decrease in physical activity due to more sedentary 
jobs, motorized transport, increasing urbanization, labor-saving devices, but also changes in 
leisure activities (television, computer games, etc. over outdoor, physical play), result in an im-
balance of calorie intake and expenditure, leading to a calorie surplus for many people. As a con-
sequence of these mainly environmental, social, and partly political changes, obesity is not only a 
problem in well-developed, high-income countries but is also increasing in developing countries. 
 Empirically, one can observe that obesity follows a strong socioeconomic gradient [Baum 
and Ruhm 2009]. For example, obesity rates are increasing with age and are inversely correlated 
with high educational level and income. Moreover, evidence from Germany suggests that single 
individuals more often have normal weight than married, divorced, or widowed persons, and 
adolescents with a migration background have a greater risk of becoming obese than natives 
[Kurth and Schaffrath Rosario 2007]. This suggests that targeted policy instruments could po-
tentially be used to achieve a more cost-effective allocation of resources. 
 The effective treatment of obesity is of crucial importance not only for the obese individ-
uals themselves, but also for the social system and employers. Treatment programs mainly con-
sist of advice on diet and physical exercise tailored to the individual patient’s needs and may be 
best characterized as behavioral weight-loss intervention programs. The fundamental require-
ment for success is to achieve an energy balance between calories spent and calorie input for 
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weight maintenance, and a state of calorie deficit for weight loss. Although behavioral interven-
tions have been proven to be effective in various studies [Appel et al. 2011], most programs are, 
at best, only modestly successful and do not address all patients adequately. In particular, some 
patients do not respond to particular interventions, and an attempt to separately identify at least 
the broad characteristics of the non-responders has not been adequately undertaken before. 
 We test for treatment-effect heterogeneity over the following six socioeconomic sub-
groups: (1) male/female, (2) single/in a relationship, (3) high educational attainment/low edu-
cational attainment, (4) native/migrant, (5) employed/not employed, and (6) urban/rural. Since 
the members of the control group who did not receive a financial incentive were also asked to 
lose weight by their physicians during their medical rehabilitation stay, a secondary objective is 
to determine which subgroup would not have lost weight without the addition of the financial 
incentive. 
 The reason for this approach is that a large-scale monetary incentive scheme will likely 
be managed by public entities or, if not, at least by organizations that will not have access to de-
tailed personal health information due to privacy restrictions or some other institutional con-
straint. However, assuming that there is substantial effect heterogeneity with respect to individ-
ual characteristics, it is a priori unclear whether the “publicly observable” characteristics, such 
as sex and employment status, are actually relevant for targeted interventions. It is entirely pos-
sible that other characteristics play a much stronger role for the effectiveness of monetary re-
wards. For instance, genetic endowment and household-specific eating and cooking conventions 
may be better predictors of weight loss, and, hence, may influence the effectiveness of the mone-
tary rewards more than any other variable. Yet, policymakers will hardly have any authentic 
information about such household and individual characteristics, and they are thus rendered ill-
suited to serve as criteria for a differential treatment in an intervention. 
 The following describe our expectations with respect to the variation in treatment ef-
fects across baseline covariates: 
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(1) Females may respond more to the financial incentive because it typically constitutes a 
larger share of their labor income. They may also be rewarded more in the labor market 
for their weight loss, since the cost of obesity for females has been shown to be higher 
(e.g., Morris [2007], Hebl and Turchin [2005], and Puhl and Heuer [2009]). Recent re-
search from Reichert [forthcoming] indicates that women also benefit more from weight 
loss if we consider their employment probabilities post-weight loss. 
(2) Single individuals may be more flexible with the use of their leisure time and be less con-
strained by intra-family conventions, which enables them to better regulate both their 
physical activity and their diets. However, singles also lack the emotional support of a 
partner [Saccone and Israel 1978]. 
(3) A high cognitive ability may be necessary to understand the benefits of losing weight, so 
we expect those with a high educational attainment to lose more weight [Halkjær et al. 
2003]. Moreover, better educated individuals may have easier access to information that 
is relevant for successfully losing body weight. The robust correlation between educa-
tion and health is documented elsewhere, such as the survey by Grossmann [2006] and 
the natural experiment analyzed by Braakmann [2011]. 
(4) Language barriers may hinder the benefits of rehabilitation for obese migrants. Howev-
er, since migrants earn, on average, less than natives (e.g., Lehmer and Ludsteck [2011]), 
the relatively higher share of the reward in their income may induce them to lose more 
weight than natives. Migrants are also observed to change their obesogenic behaviors 
upon arrival, perhaps due to acculturation [Delavari et al. 2013]. 
(5) The employed may be better equipped to lose weight, since they are more likely to be 
better educated and can afford to enroll in fitness classes. However, their leisure time 
constitutes a smaller part of their overall time budget compared to those who are not 
employed, which limits the opportunities for them to expend calories outside work. 
Moreover, the extra financial reward may not be seen as a significant amount to earn by 
losing weight. Obesity itself, of course, could potentially have an impact on employment 
prospects [Morris 2007; Reichert, forthcoming]. 
9 
 
(6) Nutritional habits exhibit a substantial rural–urban differential. Although inhabitants of 
urban areas may be exposed to unhealthier food choices (e.g., fast food), the diet in rural 
areas is still more meat-oriented in Germany (the study site). In addition, urban areas af-
ford better educational opportunities, which may mitigate the effect of the prevalence of 
junk food. This difference between rural and urban areas has been documented else-
where as well [Reeder et al. 1997; Zimmet et al. 1983]. 
2 METHODS 
The randomized controlled trial was funded by the Pakt für Forschung und Innovation and ad-
ministered by the Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI). Participants 
were invited to enroll in the experiment during the final week of their stay in a rehabilitation 
clinic in the state of Baden-Württemberg (BW) in Germany. The study protocol was approved by 
the ethics commission of the Chamber of Medical Doctors of BW. A detailed description of the 
trial is available elsewhere [Augurzky et al. 2012], but we briefly describe it here. 
 Patients that were eligible for recruitment had a BMI of 30 or above at admission, were 
aged between 18 and 75 years, and were residents of BW. The exclusion criteria included preg-
nancy, psychological and eating disorders, tumor disease within the last five years, and alcohol 
or drug abuse. Between March 2010 and August 2011, a total of 700 participants were recruited, 
though two were later excluded because of pregnancy and cancer. The last weigh-in occurred in 
January 2012. The flow of the study is depicted in Figure 1. 
 Outcomes were ascertained by trained medical personnel, who measured the height and 
weight of participants. A detailed questionnaire was administered to collect information on so-
cioeconomic background and other health-related variables. Upon clinical discharge, the respon-
sible physician set an individual weight-loss target that had to be realized within the subsequent 
four months. This was a weight reduction of about 6 to 8 percent of the patient’s weight, which 
was defined by the medical directors of the four rehabilitation clinics after discussions with the 
medical staff. Participants were stratified by clinic, and computer-aided randomization was car-
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ried out within each stratum. Random assignment to the experimental group took place after the 
weight-loss target was set by the physician in charge. Hence, the medical staff could not discrim-
inate between the different experimental groups. 
 The three experimental arms include a control group and two treatment groups, with the 
latter consisting of a group facing a €150 reward and another group with a corresponding €300 
reward for achieving the individualized weight-loss target. The amounts are in line with previ-
ous studies (e.g., Jeffery et al. [1983]) to facilitate comparison. All experimental arms received 
medical advice and counseling. Patients assigned to the treatment groups received no reward if 
their weight loss was less than 50 percent of their target weight loss. Once the threshold 
50 percent has been reached, the financial reward was disbursed proportionally, with the full 
amount paid out only if the weight-loss target was achieved or exceeded. For example, for a 
study participant in the €300 group who achieved a weight loss of 80 percent of the target, he or 
she would receive €240 (or 80 percent of €300). Once the experiment was underway, weigh-ins 
were conducted in designated pharmacies using a weighing scale operated by a pharmacist to 
avoid self-reported weight measures, which could lead to systematic measurement error. 
 The nonlinear disbursement scheme was intended to prevent participants from “gam-
ing” the system, which is also relevant to prevent harm to the study participants. If they could 
achieve the full amount after achieving a particular target, participants just around the cutoff 
may engage in unhealthy or unethical behavior to be just above the cutoff right before the 
weigh-in. For example, they could refuse to eat and drink a day before the weigh-in to lose just 
enough weight to be above the cutoff and then receive the full amount. With a proportional dis-
bursement, the likelihood to game the system this way is reduced. 
 At baseline, the study staff was blinded to the treatment group. In the pharmacy, the 
pharmacists were blinded but participants could have told the pharmacist about their treatment 
status. To prevent strategic behavior (choosing a “cooperative” pharmacist), participants were 
assigned to a specific pharmacy. Although the characteristics of dropouts were statistically dif-
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ferent from those who completed the study [Augurzky et al. 2012], the intention-to-treat analy-
sis performed below does not generate the bias that would otherwise occur from a per-protocol 
analysis (ignoring selection effects). 
 The financial incentive is positive and output-based. It is positive in the sense that partic-
ipants are rewarded for having achieved a particular goal. Negative incentives, in contrast, typi-
cally include participants paying a bond at the start of the experiment, which they can then for-
feit if they are unable to meet the criteria set by the researchers. Furthermore, it is output-based 
because the reward is conditional on having achieved the desired weight loss, which is the out-
put of behavioral decisions that an individual can take. Input-based incentives are typically tied 
to better diet and an active physical lifestyle, which are generally harder or at least more costly 
to observe than a simple measure of one’s weight on a particular date. (A taxonomy of incentive 
designs is provided in Paloyo et al. [2014].) 
 The choice of a positive, output-based incentive is guided both by efficiency considera-
tions as well as fairness. First, a negative incentive could represent a credible threat of harm to 
the study participants. We avoid that with a positive incentive since the choices of study partici-
pants are less likely to be driven by coercive forces. However, to the extent that some individuals 
are more able to lose weight relative to others, it may also be unfair to those who put in the same 
amount of effort but do not achieve the desired outcome (say, for physiological reasons). Second, 
an output-based incentive reinforces personal autonomy since it allows the participant to 
choose the optimal mix of inputs or processes to achieve their desired outcomes. Specifically 
incentivizing particular activities (gym membership, food diary, etc.) would not only be harder 
to monitor, one may also argue that it is overly paternalistic. Third, previous studies have shown 
that output-contingent incentives are more effective than process-based ones [Schmidt, Asch, 
and Halpern 2012]. 
 Mean weight loss (in kg) was calculated for the two treatment arms and the control arm. 
The result for the control group is interpreted as baseline weight loss that cannot be attributed 
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to financial rewards. The difference between average weight loss in the treatment arms and 
baseline weight loss is regarded as the incentive-induced weight loss. That is to say, we account 
for the weight loss that would occur in any case, with or without the financial incentive. This 
weight loss is likely attributable to the combination of setting a personalized weight-loss target 
and the medical advice and counseling that was afforded all study participants. 
 Outcomes are examined based on the intention-to-treat principle with the assumption 
that dropouts return to baseline. The ITT approach is a solution to deal with imperfect compli-
ance and missing data in experimental studies which still ultimately delivers unbiased estimates 
[Fisher et al. 1990; Gupta 2011]. These estimates obtained from ITT analyses are typically con-
servative (i.e., in a sense, they are the lower-bound estimates) since they are usually scaled up 
by the compliance rate. Of course, when compliance is perfectly assured, then the ITT equals the 
average treatment effect.  
 However, it is important to consider the nature of the program to see the relevance of 
the ITT estimates. A rewards system such as the one used here will likely be administered by 
policymakers on a voluntary basis. Forcing compliance would be a costly and an ethically tenu-
ous proposition. It is arguably the more policy-relevant parameter to estimate, as suggested by 
Bloom [2008]. Indeed, even if the intended program is made compulsory, any attempt to ensure 
perfect compliance is unlikely to succeed, so the relevance of the ITT parameter survives. 
 Treatment effects are estimated via ordinary least squares as the difference in weight 
loss between the treatment arms and the control arm of the experiment. Consequently, in as-
sessing the effect heterogeneity of the financial incentives on weight loss according to baseline 
characteristics, the estimation of baseline and incentive-induced weight loss was conducted over 
the subgroup categories motivated above. All estimates are presented with their associated 95-




3.1 Baseline characteristics 
Of the 700 participants that were randomized, 234 were assigned to the control group, 237 to 
the €150 group, and 229 to the €300 group; two were eventually excluded from the sample, 
while a total of 178 missed the follow-up weigh-in (i.e., 25 percent dropped out); see Figure 1 in 
Section 2. The average target weight loss is 6.5 percent from a starting average weight of 113 kg. 
The distribution of weight loss by experimental groups does not demonstrate the presence of 
outliers. 
 We regard participants as employed if they are either full- or part-time employed, mar-
ginally employed, or have not provided information on the type of their employment. Highly 
educated participants either finished the 10th grade of secondary school or hold a university-
entrance diploma (Abitur). Individuals with a good self-reported health status answered the 
question on perceived health with good or very good (the other response options were satisfac-
tory, poor, and bad). The city variable indicates individuals living in municipalities that cover 
more than one postcode. 
 Variables measured at baseline were shown to be balanced between groups (Table 1). 
About a third of the sample consists of women and about 80 percent were born in Germany (na-
tives). The mean age is 48 years and most of the participants are employed. All mean compari-
sons between groups except the percentage of German natives and the percentage of the em-
ployed for the €300 group indicate covariate balance at baseline using the method proposed by 
Hansen and Bowers [2008] for stratified experimental studies. 
3.2 Intention-to-treat effect 
The results in Figure 2 show the mean weight loss for each experimental arm in the trial. Replac-
ing the missing values for the dropouts with their initial values, one can see that the control 
group lost almost 2 kg even without the prospect of a financial reward. In the case of the two 
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treatment arms, the weight loss amounted to about 4 to 5 kg (left panel of the figure). Weight 
losses in both treatment arms were significantly higher than in the control arms, revealing that 
financial incentives can motivate people to lose weight significantly. Using information only on 
those who completed the study (completed-case or per-protocol analysis) shows a similar 
weight-loss pattern, though the mean weight loss is slightly higher for all groups (right panel of 
the figure). 
 The two panels of the graph illustrate the well-known selection bias one expects to ob-
serve in per-protocol analyses. This can occur since it is probable that those who foresee them-
selves as benefitting the most from the treatment will have a higher likelihood of completing the 
study. This endogeneity in sample attrition makes the analysis based on the intention-to-treat 
principle more reliable. The companion paper Augurzky et al. [2012] discusses endogeneity in 
more detail, with a more thorough exposition on the average treatment effect, which they 
demonstrate to be robust to a number of methods that account for sample attrition, including 
the intention-to-treat analysis. Our paper concentrates on the evidence for treatment-effect het-
erogeneity that underlies what is observed for the whole study population. 
3.3 Treatment heterogeneity 
The estimation results for mean baseline weight change (denoted as α) and for mean incentive-
induced weight change (denoted as δ), i.e., additional weight loss attributable to the monetary 
rewards, are presented in Table 2. The table further displays the statistical significance of these 
effects and the equality of baseline as well as the incentive effects between the subgroups of in-
terest. The 95% confidence intervals are also presented. 
 Overall, the estimates for the baseline weight change range from −0.179 kg (95% CI 
[−1.843, +1.485]) for those who are not employed to −2.241 kg (95% CI [−2.993, −1.489]) for 
men. The estimates for the incentive-induced weight change range from −0.962 kg (95% CI 
[−2.669, +0.745]) for urban residents (€150) to −4.272 kg (95% CI [−6.385, −2.159]) for sin-
gles (€300). Only in two instances (migrants and those living in urban areas) do we not observe 
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the €150 to induce a statistically significant weight loss (indicated by *). Increasing the financial 
incentive to €300, however, results in a significant weight loss for all these groups. Being in the 
€150 group induced the highest weight loss for those who are not working (−3.326 kg, 95% CI 
[−5.733, −0.919]), while being in the €300 group translated to maximum incentive-induced 
weight loss for singles (−4.272 kg, 95% CI [−6.385, −2.159]). 
 One can see that people who were given the standard treatment of weight-loss counsel-
ing and accompanying medical advice also lost weight, except for the subgroup of women, sin-
gles, and those who are not employed. Similar to what we can observe in the overall results, add-
ing a financial incentive on top of the standard treatment generated even more substantial 
weight losses than what would have occurred in the absence of the incentive. The chance to earn 
an extra €150 at the end of the four-month weight-loss period, for example, generates an aver-
age of 3.3 kg lost for those who are not working. 
 Higher financial rewards only correspond to significantly higher observed weight loss 
(indicated by +) for two specific subgroups (for women and migrants). The largest difference is 
for migrants: a 100-percent increase in financial incentives corresponds to a 285-percent in-
crease in weight loss (from −1.141 kg, 95% CI [−2.690, 0.408] to −3.261 kg, 95% CI [−4.810, 
−1.712]). Although the size of the estimated effect of €300 is higher for all subgroups as com-
pared to the effect of the €150 reward, the difference between the two effects is only statistically 
significant for the aforementioned groups. Therefore, while there is evidence of a positive rela-
tionship between the size of the financial incentive and the resulting amount of weight loss, the 
results indicate that the presence of a financial incentive itself is more important than its size. 
 The result for women and migrants are especially relevant considering that, first, women 
are likely to benefit the most from weight loss; and, second, that migrants (from low- and mid-
dle-income countries to high-income countries) deteriorate in health, as measured by BMI, as 
they acculturate in their new environments. As obese women lose weight, they find it more like-
ly to find employment, and the benefit to them seems to be higher than the corresponding bene-
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fit to men [Morris 2007; Reichert, forthcoming]. At least for migrant children, we have evidence 
from a natural experiment that migration increases both the BMI and the likelihood of being 
obese for 3- to 5-year olds [Stillman et al. 2012]. 
 We do not observe any significant general treatment effect heterogeneity (indicated by 
#) for the financial incentives across subgroups. However, there is some heterogeneity in the 
baseline weight change. Even though they were not motivated by financial rewards, men lost 
more weight than women, participants in a relationship lost more weight than singles (at 10-
percent significance level), and the employed lost more weight than those who are not em-
ployed. It is also notable that in each of these categories, the counterpart subgroup did not ex-
hibit any significant baseline weight reduction. However, when faced with a financial reward 
(irrespective of the amount), these groups of people are able to significantly lose weight. This 
implies that financial incentives also work for people who do not benefit from conventional in-
tervention programs. Indeed, these groups are exactly those which exhibit the most substantial 
weight loss when given a bonus for losing weight. 
 Take the case of those who are not working. Without the financial incentive, they showed 
no significant decrease in their baseline weight when subjected to an individualized target 
weight loss and medical advice and counseling alone. However, those unemployed which ended 
up in either of the incentivized arms lost quite a substantial amount (3.3 kg and 4.2 kg for an 
incentive of €150 and €300, respectively). In this case, where conventional methods of inducing 
weight loss are unsuccessful, financially incentivizing the unemployed to lose weight is a promis-
ing alternative for the relevant authorities. 
 The pattern seems to follow an income gradient, as these groups of people are more like-
ly to have an economically disadvantaged position relative to their counterparts (e.g., male vs. 
women or employed vs. not working). In fact, if we take the observations from people who be-
long to the first quartile of the income distribution (regression results are not presented but are 
available upon request), we find a similar pattern—that is, being prompted to realize a certain 
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weight-loss target alone does not generate a statistically significant change in weight, but finan-
cial incentives do, irrespective of the amount. 
4 DISCUSSION 
We deployed a large-scale, prospective, randomized, controlled field experiment designed to test 
the effectiveness of financial incentives in inducing weight loss among obese patients. The exper-
iment demonstrated that a positive, output-based financial incentive is an effective instrument 
to achieve a significant weight loss among the obese, consistent with what has been found in a 
number of previous studies [Paloyo et al. 2014]. However, a general heterogeneity in the treat-
ment effect of financial incentives is neither observed for socioeconomic characteristics nor for 
exhibited health-related behaviors in the study. Heterogeneity is observed for the impact of tra-
ditional weight-loss counseling and medical advice coupled with a personalized weight-loss tar-
get. 
 In addition, there is evidence for particular subgroups (for women and migrants) that 
increasing the amount of financial incentive has a directly proportional effect on the amount of 
weight loss. Moreover, for migrants and urban citizens, the chance to achieve €150 is not 
enough to induce further weight loss in addition to that achieved via ordinary medical advice 
and counseling. Only the higher monetary reward motivated them to lose significantly more 
weight as compared to baseline. This means that the effect of promising more money for weight 
loss generally depends on specific individual characteristics. 
 Another important result is the capacity of financial incentives to induce people to lose 
weight when they would otherwise have failed to do so when exclusively facing conventional 
treatments. This is observed for women, singles, and those who are not employed. These charac-
teristics are observed for those who are lower in the income distribution. For these groups, it is 
not sufficient simply to give them a personalized weight-loss target, medical advice, and weight-




 Since the other groups exhibited weight loss anyway (though, admittedly, the magnitude 
is smaller) even without the marginal incentive, this is a particularly relevant result for re-
source-constrained policymakers. Considering a fixed budget constraint, if the objective of the 
policy based on financial incentives is to ensure that everyone loses weight, a larger part of the 
monetary amount might be better allocated to these groups. Therefore, the publicly observable 
personal characteristics are informative enough for a potentially more efficient allocation of 
resources. 
 It is not obvious, however, that such a scenario should be the goal of public policy. For 
instance, while inducing every obese person to lose weight is desirable, ensuring that the weight 
loss is medically significant nevertheless remains a relevant factor. If that were the case, the 
obese facing higher financial incentives are most likely to lose the most weight and therefore 
reap the health benefits of such a weight loss. Although ensuring that everyone loses, say, at 
least 1 kg is an attractive proposition, it is not necessarily better than increasing the likelihood of 
a particular group of people to lose at least 5 percent of their current weight, which is often re-
garded as a threshold to improve the health status of the obese [Vidal 2002]. In other words, it is 
not altogether clear that inching everyone closer to the target is more beneficial than increasing 
the number of people who hit the target. In fact, the medical literature suggests that the latter 
should probably take precedence, since it is not likely that health benefits will accrue to an obese 
person who loses 1 kg, implying that the financial incentive used to achieve that would have 
been wasted. 
 Notably, public support for financial incentives to improve health outcomes has been 
shown to be contingent on the effectiveness of the incentives to generate the desired results 
[Promberger et al. 2012]. To the extent that its effectiveness at inducing weight loss for obese 
people has been demonstrated here, it is much more likely that a generalized or scaled-up policy 
similar to the one designed in our experiment could be put forward by national or local govern-
ments, or perhaps even private organizations, would be palatable to the eventual (tax)payer. 
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 The results of the trial raise certain ethical considerations that deserve further discus-
sion. First, there is the idea that the financial incentive could be construed as coercive since the 
amount matters for particular subgroups. Second, since there is potential for resources to be 
diverted from those who would lose weight anyway without the financial incentive to those who 
would only lose weight with the incentive, it creates a situation where an individual is rewarded 
for an outcome that another individual is able to achieve without the additional incentive. Third, 
resources may also be reallocated from those who are unresponsive to the financial incentive 
simply because they are physically, economically, or environmentally incapable of achieving the 
target outcome, raising the issue of discrimination. There are other ethical considerations apart 
from these three (e.g., the promotion of mercenary social values, stigmatization, and the under-
mining of the doctor–patient relationship) but these are general enough to the use of financial 
incentives for behavioral change. A number of them are discussed in Halpern, Madison, and 
Volpp [2009] and Lunze and Paasche-Orlow [2013]. 
 Large financial incentives could be very influential for those who are economically dis-
advantaged. A “nudge” for people falling under the right tail of the income distribution may well 
represent a “shove” for those who fall under the other tail. This could be construed as coercive 
since it potentially undermines a person’s freedom of choice. However, at least with respect to 
weight loss, the evidence available shows that people want to lose weight but are simply unable 
to do so because of, among other things, self-control issues [John, Loewenstein, and Volpp 2012]. 
Providing them with an instrument to achieve that goal is hardly coercive or punishing because 
there is no “credible threat of negative ramifications” [Lunze and Paasche-Orlow 2013:660]. 
Indeed, what merely happens is that the incentives simply allow individuals to overcome “self-
defeating tendencies toward immediate gratification without constraining [their] options” 
[Halpern, Madison, and Volpp 2009:515, emphasis supplied]. 
 This approach has been termed “asymmetric paternalism” because people are indeed 
nudged toward the ultimately beneficial choice (which would have been inaccessible to them for 
various reasons) but the incentive does not eliminate the choice to lead a more unhealthy life-
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style if the person chooses to do so, anyway [Loewenstein, Brennan, and Volpp 2007]. Of course, 
more research has to be conducted with respect to the optimal size of the incentive, i.e., identify-
ing the point where the marginal benefit is just offset by the marginal cost, and this is fertile 
ground for future researchers. 
 One may consider it unfair to pay individuals to lose weight while other individuals are 
able to do it without the additional incentive. However, whenever there is risk pooling, healthy 
individuals are already subsidizing the unhealthy individuals in the first place [Halpern, Madi-
son, and Volpp 2009]. This means that when unhealthy individuals are induced to engage in 
healthier activities, part of the benefits also accrue to those who were already healthy. This 
translates into, for example, lower health insurance premiums or a lower tax burden. The social 
cost of paying individuals to engage in healthier lifestyles may be offset by the benefits that ac-
crue directly to those individuals and the indirect benefits that healthier individuals may receive. 
 Financial incentives may also be construed as discriminatory against those who face dif-
ficulties changing their behavior for a variety of reasons. Some individuals live in “food deserts” 
where barriers that prevent access to healthy foods exist [Cummins and Macintyre 2002]. Others 
may simply not have the economic or indeed genetic capacity to change their behavior or to reap 
the benefits of their healthier activities. To make the financial reward contingent on achieving 
the desired outcome would presumably prejudice those who are less able to comply given their 
circumstances. While a negative incentive program would unduly punish those who are unable 
to achieve the outcomes or participate in the incentivized activity, positive incentives at least do 
not impinge on the opportunity to do so [Halpern, Madison, and Volpp 2009]. This potential for 
discrimination to occur raises certain legal issues as well [Gostin 2007; Schmidt, Asch, and 
Halpern 2012]. For instance, an obese and disabled person may not have the physical capacity to 
engage in an activity tied to a financial incentive. In some jurisdictions (e.g., US), an alternative 
activity may be required by law [Lunze and Paasche-Orlow 2013]. 
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 While previous studies have shown that financial incentives are effective at inducing 
weight loss [Paloyo et al. 2014], the evidence for its effectiveness at maintaining the lower 
weight is limited and not definitive [Reuss-Borst et al. 2015; Augurzky et al. 2015; Jeffery 2012]. 
The present study is unable to shed light on this issue. Parallel to the pursuit of establishing the 
effectiveness of financial incentives for weight maintenance, researchers should also consider 
whether treatment-effect heterogeneities exist in this space, much as we have considered heter-
ogeneity in the initial weight-loss phase. The results of these studies will inform on the optimal 
design of the incentive scheme which takes into account both issues of efficiency and equity or 
fairness. It may be left up to some democratic mechanism to decide over policies that are, on one 
hand, effective but unfair and, on the other hand, ineffective but fair when both cannot be simul-
taneously achieved. 
 In summary, the present paper shows that financial incentives effectively help obese 
individuals to reduce weight across all subgroups, whereas the magnitude of the reward seems 
to be relevant only for certain subgroups. Individual characteristics seem to matter more in the 
absence of monetary rewards since the paper reveals that control-group members of some sub-
groups did not significantly lose weight. We provide evidence that monetary rewards have the 
capacity to induce people to lose significant weight even if their individual characteristics imply 
unfavorable weight-loss prospects, i.e., people for whom the conventional weight-loss interven-
tion programs are unsuccessful. If the objective of a policy based on financial incentives is to 
ensure that everyone loses weight, a larger part of the monetary amount might be better allocat-
ed to these groups. However, any incentive-based policy should take into consideration the ethi-
cal issues that automatically arise out of making the incentive contingent on participation in 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (Mean Values and Standard Deviations at Baseline)  
 All Control EUR 150 EUR 300 
Initial weight (before rehab, kg) 117 ± 23 115 ± 22 118 ± 24 118 ± 24 
Starting weight (after rehab, kg) 113 ± 22 111 ± 20 114 ± 23 114 ± 23 
Target weight loss (%) 6.5 ± 1.2 6.4 ± 0.9 6.5 ± 1.3 6.5 ± 1.4 
Bad Kissingen (%) 33.4 32.2 35.6 32.3 
Bad Mergentheim (%) 41.7 41.6 40.7 42.8 
Glottertal (%) 6.60 7.30 5.90 6.60 
Isny (%) 18.3 18.9 17.8 18.3 
Female (%) 32.2 29.1 31.3 36.3 
Age (years) 48 ± 9 48 ± 10 48 ± 9 47 ± 9 
Single (%) 20.4 18.5 20.9 21.8 
Married (%) 61.1 63.1 61.3 59.0 
Native (%) 78.9 79.5 75.1 82.2+ 
Employed (%) 82.4 85.8 81.7 79.5* 
High educational attainment (%) 34.5 35.2 36.0 32.3 
Population density (1000/km2) 7.5 ± 7.3 6.9 ± 7.1 7.0 ± 7.8 7.3 ± 7.1 
City (%) 23.4 22.1 23.0 25.1 
Blood Sugar Level (mmol/l) 188 ± 37 188 ± 37 186 ± 37 200 ± 38 
Cholesterol Level (mmol/l) 101 ± 24 100 ± 23 102 ± 25 101 ± 24 
* Deviation from control group significant at 5%. + Deviation from EUR 150 group significant at 5%. ± Standard deviations of 
binary variables omitted. Bad Kissingen, Bad Mergentheim, Isny, and Glottertal refer to the locations of the four rehabilita-





Table 2 – Baseline Weight Change and Incentive-induced Weight Change by Selected Subgroups 
 Baseline Weight Change Incentive-induced Weight Change  
 





Women −0.592# [−1.737,  0.553] −2.290*, + [−3.684,−0.897] −4.007*, + [−5.401,−2.613] 222 
Men −2.241*, # [−2.993,−1.489] −2.213* [−3.385,−1.041] −2.935* [−4.107,−1.763] 467 
Single −0.560 [−2.040,  0.919] −3.115* [−5.228,−1.002] −4.272* [−6.385,−2.159] 142 
In relationship −2.054* [−2.747,−1.361] −2.024* [−3.041,−1.007] −2.918* [−3.935,−1.900] 555 
High educ.  −1.685* [−2.647,−0.724] −1.643* [−3.054,−0.232] −2.974* [−4.385,−1.563] 241 
 
Low educ.  −1.864* [−2.717,−1.012] −2.353* [−3.524,−1.182] −3.324* [−4.495,−2.152] 435 
Native −1.909* [−2.662,−1.155] −2.445* [−3.507,−1.383] −3.029* [−4.091,−1.967] 542 
Migrant −1.404* [−2.446,−0.363] −1.141+ [−2.690,  0.408] −3.261*, + [−4.810,−1.712] 145 
Employed −2.042*, # [−2.718,−1.367] −2.061* [−3.048,−1.074] −3.034* [−4.021,−2.047] 574 
Not employed −0.179# [−1.843,  1.485] −3.326* [−5.733,−0.919] −4.240* [−6.647,−1.834] 123 
Urban −1.457* [−2.727,−0.187] −0.962 [−2.669,  0.745] −2.832* [−4.539,−1.126] 160 
Rural −1.889* [−2.622,−1.156] −2.578* [−3.662,−1.494] −3.492* [−4.576,−2.408] 524 
* Weight change significant at 5%, + (δ2 − δ1) significant at 5%, 
# deviation in weight change between the two subgroups significant 
at 5%. Two-sided t-tests used. The estimates and standard errors are obtained from subgroup-specific ordinary least-square re-












Figure 2: Mean Weight Change in Body Weight by Experimental Group 
 
 
 
 
